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Abstract
This paper examines the association between concentrated ownership and the profitability of banks in
Indonesia during the period from 2012 to 2018 with a total sample of 93 banks or 651 observations.
This study applies the Random Effect regression method, and reveals a non-significant association between concentrated ownership and bank profitability as measured by ROA and ROE. It indicates that a
majority of shareholders tend to use their power to exploit minority shareholders, which can also
strengthen the monitoring effect. However, the regression also indicates that there is a significant nonlinear relationship between concentrated ownership and profitability when measured by ROE. There is
a mixed-effect between concentrated ownership and profitability in the case of Indonesian banks. Moreover, a regression is also utilized with dummy variables of concentrated ownership (FIN and IND) to
assess the difference between non-financial institution ownership and financial institution ownership.
The results show no significant difference in cases. This can be caused by institutional ownership (financial institutions), which only acts as a short-term trader that emphasizes short-term profits. Therefore, its existence as a shareholder is not any different to the presence of non-financial institution ownership. The findings of this study show that the application of POJK No. 56/POJK.03/2016 regarding
Share Ownership of Commercial Banks which regulates the maximum limit of concentrated ownership
in banks may not work effectively in strengthening bank performance.
Keywords: Concentrated ownership, banks, OJK regulations, bank performance, expropriation.

Abstrak
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk meneliti pengaruh kepemilikan terkonsentrasi terhadap profitabilitas bank
di Indonesia pada periode tahun 2012 sampai dengan tahun 2018 dengan sampel sejumlah 93 bank atau
651 observasi. Pengujian dengan metode regresi Random Effect menunjukkan hubungan tidak signifikan
antara kepemilikan terkonsentrasi dengan profitabilitas bank yang diukur dengan ROA dan ROE. Hal
ini mengindikasikan bahwa pemegang saham mayoritas bukan hanya dapat memanfaatkan kekuasaan
yang dimilikinya untuk mengekspropriasi pemegang saham minoritas, namun juga dapat memperkuat
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pelaksanaan fungsi pengawasan. Selain itu, hasil regresi juga menunjukkan bahwa terdapat hubungan
signifikan non-linear antara kepemilikan terkonsentrasi dan profitabilitas ketika diukur menggunakan
ROE. Maka dari itu, pada kasus bank di Indonesia, terdapat mixed-effect terkait kepemilikan terkonsentrasi dan profitabilitas. Selanjutnya, regresi dengan menggunakan variable dummy dari kepemilikan terkonsentrasi (FIN dan IND) untuk melihat apakah ada perbedaan pada performa bank yang dikuasai oleh
lembaga keuangan dan non-lembaga keuangan. Hasilnya menunjukan tidak adanya perbedaan signifikan. Hal ini dapat disebabkan ketika kepemilikan lembaga keuangan hanya bertindak sebagai investor
jangka pendek atau short-term trader yang tujuannya adalah keuntungan jangka pendek. Sehingga
kehadiran dari kepemilikan lembaga keuangan tersebut tidak berbeda dari kehadiran kepemilikan
lembaga non-keuangan. Hasil dari penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa penerapan POJK Nomor
56/POJK.03/2016 tentang Kepemilikan Saham Bank Umum, yang mengatur batasan maksimum
kepemilikan terkonsentrasi pada perbankan, untuk membantu meningkatkan performa bank belum berjalan secara efektif.
Kata Kunci: Kepemilikanterkonsentrasi, bank, peraturan OJK, performa bank, ekspropriasi.

INTRODUCTION
Banks are one of the cornerstones that
help drive the economy in today’s emerging
economies because they tend to finance
their countries’ economic growth through
bank loans (Vo 2017). Banking is one of the
most highly regulated industries because a
crisis for banks will impact the overall
economy of a country. Therefore, banks are
required to have higher corporate governance compared to other industries (Bolton
2002).
Good corporate governance is needed
for a more effective, objective, and transparent practice of the company's operations.
This is important in order to maintain the
alignment of the achievement of company
goals and to avoid managerial behavior that
can harm the company. Rationally, each
person has the desire to benefit themselves.
In the company context, shareholders have
a desire to maximize the performance and
value of a company, while managers have
the desire to prioritize their own interests.
Such a scheme is known as the agency
problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
When an agency problem occurs, the
agency cost will increase because the
management's actions are not in accordance
with the wishes of the shareholders, and can
certainly affect the company's performance
or value. In Indonesia, a study conducted on
the relationship between the application of
corporate governance and the profitability

of banks revealed an insignificant relationship (Putra et al. 2019). This is allegedly because the implementation of governance
was still not optimal, as there were no clear
consequences for governance non-compliance.
Corporate governance plays a large
role in protecting investors because without
it, investors cannot ensure that the funds
they have invested in the company are well
managed by managers (Shleifer and Vishny
1986). There are several corporate governance mechanisms to address agency
problems, one of which is concentrated
ownership, which is one of the important
mechanisms to reduce agency problems (La
Porta et al. 1998). Under concentrated
ownership, owners can directly influence
management to protect their interests
(Shleifer and Vishny 1986).
Concentrated ownership can overcome agency problems through monitoring
effects. Some researchers believe that concentrated ownership can monitor manager
behavior because ownership in a large percentage is considered to have strong
influence and a better ability to conduct supervision (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Thus,
managers become more controlled in their
behavior and cannot act to benefit themselves, thus reducing the prosperity of
shareholders (Shleifer andVishny 1986).
On the contrary, the existence of concentrated ownership can also lead to another
agency problem, namely an expropriation
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effect in which there is a tendency for majority shareholders to seize the rights of
minority shareholders through the control
they have (Faccio and Stolin 2006; Shleifer
andVishny 1997).
According to La Porta et al. (2002),
developing countries still lack investor protection and regulation of corporate governance compared to developed countries. A
study by La Porta et al. (1999, 1997, 1998,
2002) recognized that there are differences
in the legal systems of various countries; the
level of investor protection was found to be
higher in common law countries and weaker
in civil law countries. Indonesia is a civil
law country thus it has low investor
protection. This affects how shareholders
can easily take advantage of their control
and allow the emergence of expropriation
effects (La Porta et al. 2002).
The relationship between concentrated ownership and value, or performance,
and the efficiency of the company is still under debate. Many previous studies have examined the relationship between concentrated ownership with performance on both
non-financial companies and financial or
banking companies (Alimehmeti and
Paletta 2012; Bian and Deng 2017;
Boussaada and Karmani 2015; Lee and Lee
2014; Ozili and Uadiale 2017; Saidi and AlShammari 2015; Surifah 2011; Yasser and
Mamun 2017). However, the results of
these studies are not consistent. Some results state that there is a positive association
between concentrated ownership and bank
profitability due to monitoring effects
(Boussaada and Karmani 2015; Ozili and
Uadiale 2017; Yasser and Mamun 2017).
Other studies also state that the relationship
between the two is negative because of the
dominating effect of expropriation (Bian
and Deng 2017; Lee and Lee 2014).
Some studies have also found that
concentrated ownership and company performance have a non-linear relationship due
to the mixed-effects between the monitoring
and
expropriation
effects
(Alimehmeti and Paletta 2012; Enqvist
2005). According to Alimehmeti and

Paletta (2012), the relationship between
concentrated ownership and company performance is basically positive (monitoring
effect dominates). However, when a crisis
occurs, a negative association between concentrated ownership and performance arises
due to the more dominant expropriation
effect. Some studies actually state that concentrated ownership actually has no after
effect on company performance (Demsetz
and Lehn 1985: King and Santor 2007;
Surifah 2011). Surifah (2011) stated that the
percentage of concentrated ownership has
no effect on profitability because concentrated ownership has existed for a long time
and is not sensitive to changes in the percentage of ownership, thus it does not have
an impact on the bank's profitability.
This is an interesting research topic
for review because there are still inconsistencies within the results of previous
studies. Indonesia was selected for observation for several reasons. First, the lack
of shareholder protection in developing
countries usually leads to high ownership
concentration (La Porta et al. 1998).
Secondly, Indonesia ranked first in terms of
the country with the highest number of
banks across South East Asia (Ananta 2019;
Hariyanti 2018). In addition, the existence
of regulations in Indonesia that regulate
concentrated ownership for banks makes
this topic even more pertinent. This latter
aspect is regulated by the Peraturan Otoritas
Jasa Keuangan (POJK) No. 56/ POJK.03/
2016 regarding the Share Ownership of
Commercial Banks in relation to the
limitation of bank share ownership in
Indonesia. Indonesia’s banks are encouraged by the government to consolidate
with the hope of strengthening the capital
structure of the bank. In order to support
Indonesia's bank consolidation, the government has issued regulations related to the
limitation of bank share ownership in
Indonesia. The basis for the establishment
of this regulation by Bank Indonesia (BI) is
the failure to regulate good governance in
banks; thereby it became the main cause of
the financial crisis in 1997, which indicated
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that concentrated ownership in banks was
related to the implementation of banking
governance. This is reflected in POJK No.
56/POJK.03/2016 regarding the Share
Ownership of Commercial Banks, which
explains that the basis for the founding of
this regulation was in consideration of
Indonesia’s financial crisis in 1997. The
crisis showed that ownership domination,
especially concentrated ownership of a
bank, is closely and negatively related to the
implementation of good banking governance (OJK 2016). Many bank owners at
the time were also company owners, so
when a crisis occurred, the owner of the
company took advantage of the bank they
owned for the sake of their company
(Surifah 2011). This expropriation act of
concentrated shareholders eventually sacrificed the banks and the minority shareholders of these banks. Moreover, since the
regulation of POJK No. 11/POJK.03/2016
stated that the minimum capital requirement
of a bank only varies between 8%-14%,
then the remaining 86%-92% of the banks’
capital is gained from its customers. This insinuates that the customers suffer more
from expropriation. The researchers expect
that this study will reveal a negative association between concentrated ownership of
banking performance so that it can support
the implementation of the limitation of concentrated ownership in Indonesian banks.
This study also examined how concentrated ownership limitation is applied by
banks in Indonesia. According to the
Indonesian Banking Statistics (OJK2018),
the number of banks in Indonesia in 2018
amounted to 115 banks. This was not in line
with the provision of regulators or the
government, which can be seen from the
government's efforts to continue bank consolidation in Indonesia so that the numbers
are reduced. In addition, there is an important aspect to consider: since Indonesia
as a developing country prioritizes bankoriented financing, BI wants bank ownership in Indonesia to be dispersed through
bank consolidation. The aim is not to create
dominance of share ownership in banks, so
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that it can later strengthen bank resilience
through its capital structure (OJK 2016).
Thus, this research aims to contribute
empirical evidence regarding the suitability
of the implementation of regulations to
strengthen capital structure through a dispersed ownership structure. If it is proven
that concentrated ownership is negatively
and significantly associated with the profitability of the company, then this will provide insight that banks can increase their incentives through dispersed ownership and
thus improve profitability.
Reference to OJK regulations related
to the limitation of share ownership in banks
reveals that the classification of ownership
limits is based on company categories.
Bank and non-bank financial institutions
have the largest maximum ownership limit
of 40%, while the non-financial institution
ownership limit is 30%, and 20% for individual ownership. Many hope that the composition of such bank ownership limits can
strengthen the resilience of banks in facing
economic developments. From the composition of ownership determined by the regulator, financial institutions appear to have
the largest composition compared to non-financial institutions and individuals. In other
words, financial institutions are trusted as
owners who can manage the bank better
than non-financial institutions and individuals can. This is also in line with the
findings by Chan and Lakonishok (1995),
where institutional ownership such as in financial institutions is more sophisticated
than the ownership of other institutions.
Within the ownership structure of a company, institutional ownership is one of the
instruments of corporate governance
(Wardhani 2007). Shleifer (1986) found a
positive relationship between institutional
ownership and company performance for
reason, that institutional ownership can actively monitor the company (active monitoring), minimize agency problems, and
prevent information asymmetry.
On the contrary, there is another study
that does not find a significant relationship
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between institutional ownership and company performance such as demonstrated in
Kuwait, because corporate governance has
not received much attention there (Saidi and
Al-Shammari 2015). David and Kochhar
(1996) expressed a different view of passive
monitoring. This view assumes that institutional ownership does not interfere in
management and tends to involve shortterm traders to gain short-term profits. In
such a case, a negative relationship between
institutional ownership and company performance will occur. Elyasiani and Jia
(2010) also found a negative relationship
based on the exploitation view, in which institutional investors can side with management to exploit minority shareholders and
reduce company performance in the interest
of institutional ownership. Cornett et al.
(2007) also support this argument, stating
that some short-term institutional owners or
traders mostly pay attention to the shortterm results rather than long-term development. Thus, they might try to gain self-advantages at the cost of other shareholders.
Because there are still inconsistencies in the
results of research between institutional
ownership and company performance, this
study serves as an interesting contribution
to this field of research. It will also examine
the application of regulations for the limiting ownership of financial institutions and
non-financial institutions in Indonesian
banks.
Similar to research conducted by La
Porta et al. (1998), this study is also fixated
on testing the effects of concentrated
ownership on company performance. In addition, it also focuses on the existence of
POJK No. 56/POJK.03/2016 regarding
Share Ownership of Commercial Banks and
the absence of previous studies that conducted difference testing on bank performance and bank concentrated ownership by
financial institutions and non-banks. Therefore, the main contribution of this research
is to analyze the suitability between OJK
regulations and the actual condition of
banks in Indonesia. The outcomes of this

study revealed a negative significant relationship between concentrated ownership
and the performance of banks in Indonesia.
Concentrated ownership by non-financial
institutions in banks also shows better performance compared to concentrated ownership by financial institutions.
This study is divided into several
parts. The first part provides the introduction. The second part consists of the literature review and hypothesis development.
The following third part provides the research method, and the fourth part discusses
the results and discussion. The last and fifth
part confers conclusions, implications, and
limitations.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Literature Review
Agency Theory
According to the study of Jensen and
Meckling (1976), agency relations represent a relationship between one or a group
of people termed principals with another
one or a group of people termed agents, in
which the principal has the right to delegate
agents of authority in making decisions to
help realize their interests. In practice,
agents do not always act in accordance with
the principal's interests due to differences in
interests between the two (Rankin et al.
2012).
Jensen and Meckling (1976) declared
three categories of relationships that can
cause agency problems. The first is the relationship between shareholders and management. This relationship explains the importance of the differences in interests (as a
principal) with those in management (as an
agent).
Subsequently, the second one is the
relationship between the majority shareholders and minority shareholders. The
agency problem in this relationship might
arise when the majority of shareholders do
things that can harm minority shareholders,
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such as seizing the rights of minority shareholders because the majority shareholders
have more control over the company.
The third is the relationship between
the company (internal) and stakeholders
outside the company (external), such as
creditors. An agency problem that might
arise in this relationship occurs when the
company (agent) ignores the rights of the
creditor (principal).
Within the company, efforts are
needed to avoid or resolve agency problems
when such problems arise between two parties, such as monitoring. Monitoring action
is applied to prevent agents from taking
actions that are outside the company's interests for personal gain.
Specifically, in this study, agency
problems could arise due to the existence of
concentrated ownership. There are two
cases regarding concentrated ownership and
agency problems. The first one is the
agency problem between majority shareholders and the manager, or is widely
known as the monitoring effect. In this situation, the majority shareholders with concentrated ownership will likely monitor and
control the manager to make sure that the
decisions made are in the interest of the
shareholders. The second one is the agency
problem between the majority and minority
shareholders, or otherwise recognized as the
expropriation effect. In this case, the majority or controlling shareholders will act as the
principals and utilize their power to seize
the rights of minority shareholders who act
as agents. This can be done by exploiting
company resources and taking corporate actions for personal interests as opposed to the
rights of minority shareholders.
There are also some existing literature
regarding two topics that are important for
ownership structure but yet to be examined
in this research, thus serves as a limitation
of this study. The first topic is the difference
between ownership or cashflow rights and
control/voting rights, which result in either
an alignment or entrenchment effect. The
second is the role of multiple large shareholders.
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However, although these two topics
are not examined in this study, their concepts will still be explained in this section.
Initially, when the largest shareholders have
greater ownership or cash flow rights, they
may be able to reduce the agency cost due
to the incentive and means to supervise the
agent. Thus greater cash flow rights create
more incentive for the shareholders to optimize the shareholders’ wealth, hence
raising the profitability of a firm (Claessens
et al. 2002; Utama et al. 2017). This is
called the alignment effect. As the
divergence between cash flow rights and
control rights broaden, the controlling
shareholders tend to expropriate the rights
of the minority shareholders. When the
controlling shareholders expropriate the
company assets for their own private benefit, it will reduce the company value and
profitability, in which this is called the entrenchment effect (Attig et al. 2008; Utama
et al. 2017). In other words, when there is a
large divergence on cash flow rights and
control rights, the willingness to increase
firm value is less restrained by the
controlling shareholders (Claessens et al.
2002), thus reducing the performance.
Subsequently, having multiple large
shareholders (MLS) helps to strengthen the
monitoring role (Attig et al. 2009). The existence of MLS promotes the alleviation of
the expropriation risk, especially those involving private benefits, since it will require
mutual consent among the MLS. Furthermore, there will be a competition of control
between the MLS which will help in
providing check and balance between them.
Hypothesis Development
Concentrated Ownership and Bank Profitability in Indonesia
A study conducted by La Porta et al.
(1999) discovered that concentrated ownership of dominant shareholders was
commonly found within registered companies around the world. In addition, generally
companies with concentrated ownership are
followed by high control or control rights by
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controlling shareholders, in which the controlling rights possessed affect the
company's performance (Claessens et al.
2000; Faccio and Lang 2002; Du and Dai
2005; La Porta et al.1999; AzofraPalenzuela and Santamaria-Mariscal 2007).
The effect of concentrated ownership on
company performance can cause two
effects: namely monitoring fand expropriation effects.
Concentrated ownership can lead to
monitoring effects when controlling shareholders utilize the power they have to carry
out the monitoring role of the company. The
intended monitoring is executed by a principal who in this case represents the concentrated shareholders ensuring that the
manager will act according to the interest of
the shareholders. Therefore, if the monitoring effect occurs, it is foreseen to possess
a positive impact on company performance.
Research related to monitoring effects is
proven in studies conducted by Boussaada
and Karmani (2015), Ozili and Uadiale
(2017), and Yasser and Mamun (2017).
However, concentrated ownership
can also have a negative impact, including
the seizure of rights of minority shareholders by majority shareholders, or what is
known as the expropriation effect. The
controlling shareholder who acts as
principal uses his power to seize the rights
of minority shareholders who act as agents,
by utilizing company resources and taking
corporate actions for personal interests with
no regard to the rights of minority shareholders. Research on the existence of the
expropriation effect from concentrated
ownership is evidenced by several previous
studies (Bian and Deng 2017; Lee and Lee
2014). Furthermore, the expropriation could
lead to a decrease in profitability due to the
lack of shareholder protection. For example, banks with concentrated ownership
usually tend to offer large loans to entities
who have a connection with the banks’ majority shareholders, which might sacrifice
bank performance and profitability
(Sapienza 2004).

In Indonesia, the emergence of the expropriation effect on concentrated ownership was expected to arise during the financial crisis that occurred in 1997. Many
banks with concentrated ownership are
closely related and negatively related to the
implementation of good banking governance because they use their control to take
advantage of private companies. This is also
in line with the evidence found by
Alimehmeti and Paletta (2012) and Bian
and Deng (2017). This has also become the
basis for BI to issue policies related to the
maximum limit of share ownership in
banks, namely PBI Number 14/8/PBI/2012
regarding Commercial Bank Share Ownership. BI issued the regulation with the aim
of avoiding concentrated ownership so that
it could improve the implementation of
good governance as well as strengthen national banking endurance. However, because the function of BI to oversee banks
has been transferred to the OJK, the regulation has changed to POJK No. 56/
POJK.03/2016 regarding Commercial Bank
Share Ownership. This shows that the
regulator wants banking ownership in Indonesia to not be concentrated in one
particular party.
The regulations related to the bank
share ownership limit issued by the OJK
were legitimated in 2016, so for now the
application of the OJK policy is suspected
to have not been fully implemented by
banks in Indonesia. This seems especially
likely considering the difficulty and time required for shareholders to adjust their
ownership structure according to the OJK
regulations. This claim is also supported by
the number of commercial banks in
Indonesia which are still more than 100 in
number (OJK2018), where Indonesia has
the largest number of banks in Southeast
Asia (Ananta 2019; Hariyanti 2018).
Based on these considerations, to
address the first hypothesis, this study intends to test whether the ownership structure of banks in Indonesia is currently in
accordance with OJK regulations without
analyzing the composition of its share-
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holders. This study will also test whether
concentrated ownership will pose a
negative association with banking performance in Indonesia, as seen from OJK regulation efforts to limit bank ownership.
Additionally, since a non-linear relationship
between concentrated ownership and profitability will also be present due to the mixedeffects between the monitoring effects and
expropriation effects, this study will also
test the non-linear relationship between
concentrated ownership and profitability.
H1 : Concentrated ownership is negatively associated with bank
profitability.
Profitability Difference in Concentrated
Ownership of Financial Institutions and
Non-Financial Institutions in Indonesian
Banks
OJK as a financial sector regulator in
Indonesia seeks to consolidate banks in order to strengthen the banking capital structure in Indonesia. This regulator's efforts are
reflected in POJK No. 56/POJK.03/2016
concerning Commercial Bank Share
Ownership. This is intended to strengthen
the banks, especially with increasing competition among banks. This OJK regulation
provides the largest ownership limit on
banks to financial institutions because it is
expected that the limits of banking ownership can strengthen banking when dominated by financial institutions.
The expectation of a positive association between profitability and ownership of
financial institutions in banks in Indonesia
is supported by several previous studies,
such as Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Kao et
al. (2018), and Yasser and Mamun (2017).
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) identified that
institutional ownership can improve the
efficiency and performance of companies
with their ability to oversee managers and
provide funds for companies in need. The
results of this study are also referred to as
active monitoring views.
Musallam et al. (2018) found that institutional ownership can result in a decrease in the performance of companies in
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Indonesia, due to the inability of concentrated institutional owners to supervise
managers. Elyasiani and Jia (2010) also
found a negative relationship based on the
exploitation view, in which institutional investors can side with the management to exploit minority shareholders and reduce
company performance. Negative relationships also arise based on the view of passive
monitoring, under which institutional
owners are seen as short-term traders who
only prioritize short-term profits to further
their interests (David and Kochhar 1996)
Based on the OJK regulations related
to banking ownership limitations and the inconsistency of research results, in the
second hypothesis this study examines
whether there are differences in performance between concentrated banks owned
by financial institutions and those owned by
non-financial institutions. In addition, this
study also examines the application of the
regulations for limiting share ownership of
financial institutions and non-financial institutions in Indonesian banks according to
POJK No. 56/POJK.03/2016 regarding
"Maximum Share Ownership Limits". In
this study, non-financial institutions include
individuals.
H2 : There is a significant difference
in the association of profitability
and concentrated ownership on
financial institutions and non-financial institutions.
The following is an overview of the
research regarding the ramification of concentrated ownership on bank profitability.
The independent variable is concentrated
ownership, while bank performance is the
dependent variable. Control variables are
company size, company age, credit risk,
company growth, and GDP, which are also
described as influences on banking
performance.
The first control variable, company
size, is deemed to have the ability to
influence firm performance due to the
argument that large companies have more
resources and thus have a competitive
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Figure 1
Research Framework

advantage to become profitable (Wahba
2008). Subsequently, similar reasons also
explained the impact of company age on
company performance. Mature companies
are considered to have more expertise in the
field, which boosts profitability. Another
variable, company growth, positively
affects performance. This is shown by the
high growth that will increase the performance measured by profitability level (Le
and Phan 2017). Credit risk could negatively affect company performance; research finds that a less profitable company
usually conducts high-risk activities, therefore a high-risk company shows inferior
performance (Menicucci and Paoluci 2016;
Alu 2016). Lastly, the GDP growth rate
controls company performance because it
contributes to the development of the business environment and lowers the barrier
bank entry (Liu and Wilson 2009).
RESEARCH METHOD
Population and Sample
The population of this research includes all commercial banks in Indonesia,
both publicly listed on the Indonesia Stock
Exchange (IDX) and non-public for the period of 2012 to 2018. The data used in this
study is secondary data obtained from the
IDX website, the website for each bank, and
the website of the Ministry of Trade of the
Republic of Indonesia. The criteria for inclusion in the sample are as follows: 1) a

banking company in Indonesia that operated from 2012 to 2018; 2) a banking company that has published annual reports from
2012 to 2018; and 3) a banking company
limited to the category of a commercial
bank. Commercial banks whose ownership
is concentrated by the central government
and branch offices of banks domiciled
abroad are excluded from the sample. This
is done based on the criteria for ownership
limits listed in POJK No. 56/ POJK.03/
2016 regarding Commercial Bank Share
Ownership.
Data Analysis Method
Below are all the models used in this
study. Models 1 and 2 are used to test Hypothesis 1; while Models 3 and 4 are employed to test the possible non-linear relation between CON and ROE/ROA. Meanwhile, Models 5 and 6 are utilized to test
Hypothesis 2. To prove Hypothesis 1, 𝛽1 is
expected to be negative. Meanwhile for
Hypothesis 2, it is expected that 𝛽4 to be different from zero.
Variable Operationalization
The variables used in this study are divided into three categories: the dependent
variable, the main independent variable,
and the control variable. First, the
dependent variable in this study is profitability, namely ROA and ROE. The main independent variable in this research is
ownership and is concentrated in the form
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Table 1
Research Sample
Number of
Companies

Number of
Observations

Commercial banks registered per 2018.

115

805

Commercial banks owned by the central government.

(4)

(28)

Commercial banks which are branch offices of a bank
domiciled abroad.

(9)

(63)

Commercial banks that do not have complete data on
annual reports and/or financial reports for 2012 to 2018.

(9)

(63)

Companies used as a sample

93

651

Sample Selection Criteria

Source: from data processed.

Model 1:
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
Model 2:
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
Model 3:
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑁𝑇2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
Model 4:
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑁𝑇2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
Model 5:
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑂𝑁 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑂𝑁 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
Model 6:
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑂𝑁 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑂𝑁 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

Explanation:
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡

:
:
:

𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 :
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑁𝑇2𝑖𝑡 :
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡

:

𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡

:

𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝐷𝐵𝑖𝑡

:
:
:
:
:

Return on Assets bank (company) in year t.
Return on Equity bank (company) in year t.
Concentrated ownership in year t (dummy variable; 1 = ownership above
40%, 0 = others).
Concentrated ownership in year t (dummy variable; 1 = ownership above
40%, 0 = others).
Concentrated ownership in year t (dummy variable; 1 = ownership above
40%, 0 = others).
Concentrated financial ownership in year t (dummy variable; 1 = financial
institutions ownership, 0 = others)
Concentrated individual ownership in year t (dummy variable; 1 = individual
ownership, 0 = others).
Company size in year t.
The age of the company since its establishment up to year t.
Credit risk in year t.
The amount of sales growth from the company every year.
Indonesia’s Growth Domestic Product (GDP) at year t.
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Table 2
Variable Operationalization
Variable

Definition

Measurement

Literature
Source

Dependent Variable
Return on Assets
(ROA)

The ratio measures the ability
of banks to generate profits
from their assets.

𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡
=
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡

Circular Letter
from Financial
Service
Authority (OJK)
No.
11/SEOJK.03/20
15

Return on Equity
(ROE)

The ratio measures the ability
of banks to generate profits
from their equity.

𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡
=
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡

Circular Letter
from Financial
Service
Authority (OJK)
No.
11/SEOJK.03/20
15

Main Independent Variable
Concentrated
Ownership
(CON,
CONPRCNT)

Share ownership in banks is
concentrated, which means
that the direct largest
ownership of shares
represents a significant
percentage of ownership.

Direct ownership of the
largest shareholder above
40% is included in
concentrated ownership.

Financial
Institutions
(FIN)

The identity of the largest
Dummy variable of financial
direct owner is financial
institutions ownership.
institutions. Financial
institutions ownership is the
fraction of a firm's shares that
are held by institutional
investors. Financial
institutions include banks,
insurance companies, and
pension funds.

Chung and
Zhang, 2011;
Del Guercio,
1996

Individuals
(IND)

The identity of the largest
direct owner is individuals.
Individual ownership is also
the ultimate owner since they
control themselves as a
person.

La Porta et al.
1999

Dummy variable of
individual ownership

POJK No.
56/POJK.03/201
6

Control Variable
Company Size
(SIZE)

The amount of assets owned
by the bank.

𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡

Ehsan and Javid
(2015) ; Lepore
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et al. (2017);
Yasser and
Mamun (2017)
Company Age
(AGE)

The bank’s age from the
beginning it was formed until
t.

Growth
(GROWTH)

Bank’s sales growth every
year.

NPL gross(NPL)

Non-performing loans that
are substandard quality,
doubtful, and congested.

Gross Domestic
Growth (GDP)

Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) growth in Indonesia.

The type of Banks
(PUBL)

The type of the bank (Public
or Non-Public Banks)

𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡
= 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
− 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡−1
=
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡

𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 =

𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 =

Michaelas et al.
(1999)

Le and Phan
(2017)

𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡

Menicucci and
Paolucci (2016);
Alu (2016)

𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1

Boussaada and
Karmani (2015)

Dummy variable of the type
of Banks
Source: from various sources

of a dummy variable. Finally, there are five
control variables in this study, namely
SIZE, AGE, GROWTH, NPL, and GDP.
This study uses unbalanced panel
data. In determining the appropriate regression model, this study utilizes three tests of
model accuracy, namely the Chow test, the
Hausman test, and the Lagrange Multiplier
(LM) test. The results of the Chow test and
the Hausman test recommend that this study
uses a fixed effect model, while the results
of the LM test recommend this study uses
the random effects model. Thus, according
to these accuracy tests, the fixed effect
model is the suitable method for this study.
However, Gujarati and Porter (2009) claim
that there are several issues that need to be
considered if a researcher wants to use the
fixed effect model, or what is widely known
as the Least-Squares Dummy Variable
(LSDV) model. One such issue is that if too
many dummy variables are in the study,
there will be a problem with the degree of
freedom. This is because the research will
experience insufficient observations to
perform meaningful statistical analysis.
Simply put, the use of the fixed effect model
in studies that use too many dummy

variables can cause problems in the degree
of freedom. According to Gujarati and
Porter (2009), the use of the LSDV
technique distinguishes individuals (banks)
that use dummy variables. Given that this
study uses a large number of banks, it is
very likely that there will be a problem with
the degree of freedom. This issue is also in
line with Nachrowi and Usman (2006), in
particular if the panel data collected has an
individual number (i) greater than the
amount of time (t), it is recommended that
researchers use the random effects method.
As mentioned earlier, the number of individuals (banks) in this study totaled 93
banks, while the length of time of this study
was only 7 years. In other words, the random effects method tends to be more suitable for this study. In addition, the fixed
effects method accommodates the existence
of individual differences but cannot accommodate differences between times (Gujarati
and Porter 2009). This study has data that
changes every year (time variant), such as
SIZE which tends to experience growth
every year, AGE that experiences growth
every year, NPL which sometimes
fluctuates every year, GROWTH that varies
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Table 3
Data Description
Banks

Type of Bank

Concentrated
Ownership

Proportions

Public
Non-Public
Total
Observations
Financial
Non-Financial
Individual
Total
observations

23.66%
76.34%
100.00%
56.29%
38.05%
5.66%
100.00%

Table 4
Descriptive Statistics
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

ROA
644
0.0159
0.0345
-0.2013
0.7100
ROE
644
0.0955
0.1508
-1.4248
0.5798
CON
636
0.7406
0.4387
0.0000
1.000
CONPRCNT
636
0.6195
0.2630
0.1246
1.000
FIN
636
0.5629
0.4964
0.0000
1.000
IND
636
0.0566
0.2313
0.0000
1.000
SIZE
644
30.1877
1.4338
26.8110
34.3462
AGE
651
39.2304
16.5954
2.0000
105.000
NPL
642
0.0279
0.0309
0.0000
0.4399
GROWTH
619
0.1643
0.2957
-0.6570
3.0790
GDP
651
0.0525
0.0038
0.0488
0.0603
ROA = profit before tax / average total assets; ROE = profit after tax / average total equity; CON =
dummy variable (1 = share ownership above 40%, 0 = others); SIZE = company size; AGE = company
age; NPL = credit risk; GROWTH = company revenue growth; GDP = GDP growth.
Source: from data processed.

every year, and also GDP that experiences
movement every year. In other words, the
data from this study are less suitable for the
fixed effects model. Another idea that
supports the use of the random effects
model is that this research data has problem
of heteroscedasticity. This problem arises
when errors from the data model do not
have constant variance. The use of the
Random Effect method can overcome this
problem (Gujarati and Porter2009). Several
previous studies that investigated the association of ownership structure and company
performance also used the random effects

regression model (Gedajlovic and Shapiro
2002; Musallam et al. 2018). Because of
these aspects, it is determined that the
model to be used is the random effects
model.
The classic assumption test results in
this study stated that the data were normally
distributed, had no symptoms of autocorrelation or symptoms of multicollinearity, but
had symptoms of heteroscedasticity. Since
this study uses the random effects method,
the symptoms of heteroscedasticity can be
overcome (Gujarati and Porter 2009).
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Table 5
Hypothesis 1 Test Results

CON

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

ROA

ROE

ROA

ROE

Coefficient

p-value

Coefficient

p-value

-0.0010

0.599

-0.0128

0.235

CONPRCNT2

Coefficient

p-value

Coefficient

p-value

-0.0035

0.248

-0.0349

0.068

FIN

-0.0049

0.023**

-0.0651

0.000***

-0.0042

0.062*

-0.0601

0.000***

IND

0.0035

0.370

-0.0532

0.025**

0.0030

0.439

-0.0555

0.019

SIZE

0.0046

0.000***

0.0352

0.000***

0.0048

0.000***

0.0364

0.000***

AGE

0.0002

0.012**

0.0006

0.211

0.0001

0.036

0.0004

0.425

NPL

-0.3818

0.000***

-2.0691

0.000***

-0.3785

0.000***

-2.0577

0.000***

GROWTH

0.0111

0.000***

0.0829

0.000***

0.0112

0.000***

0.0837

0.000***

GDP

0.6889

0.000***

7.3936

0.000***

0.6813

0.000***

7.3126

0.000***

PUBL

-0.0122

0.000***

-0.0701

0.000***

-0.0131

0.000***

-0.0768

0.000***

-0.0110

0.117

-0.0644

0.130

-0.1518

0.000***

-1.2671

0.000***

CONPRCNT
_cons

-0.1516

0.000***

-1.2637

0.000***

Prob>chi2

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Adj R-sq

0.4351

0.4985

0.4465

0.5121

P-value at: *** 𝛼 = 1%, ** 𝛼 = 5%, *𝛼 = 10%. ROA = profit before tax / average total assets; ROE = profit after
tax / average total equity; CON = dummy variable (1 = share ownership above 40%, 0 = others); CONPRCNT2 =
quadratic value of the largest amount of concentrated ownership; FIN = dummy variable (1 = largest share owned
by financial institutions, 0 = others); IND = dummy variable (1 = largest share owned by individuals, 0 = others);
SIZE = company size; AGE = company age; NPL = credit risk; GROWTH = company revenue growth; GDP =
GDP growth; PUBL = dummy variable (1 = public bank, 0 = others); CONPRCNT = mean-adjusted value of the
largest amount of concentrated ownership.
Source: from data processed.

RESULT AND ANALYSIS
Table 3 depicts that the majority of
the banks in the observations are non-public
banks (76.34%). 56.29% of the observed
banks are owned by financial institutions
and 38.05% are owned by non-financial institutions. Meanwhile, only 5.66% of the
observed banks are owned by individuals.
Table 4 shows the results of the descriptive
statistics from the studies on 93 banks
with651 observations. The average of
banking performance in the form of ROA
and ROE are 0.0159 and 0.0955,
respectively. Furthermore, from the result
of the descriptive statistics, it is also
insinuated that there are some observations
with a negative value of ROA and ROE.
The negative values on these variables are

due to the fact that the banks had negative
returns or suffered a loss during the
observation period. These bank-years with
negative ROA and ROE values are still used
as observations because although showing
negative returns, the values of the equity are
still positive. CON showed a mean of
0.7406, which means 74.06% of the
observations have direct ownership of more
than 40%. The smallest value of the
CONPRCNT variable is 0.1246, while the
largest is 1, which means some banks are
100% owned and concentrated by one party
such as Bank BRI Syariah, Bank Syariah
Mandiri (Persero) Tbk, and Bank BCA
Syariah. The average CONPRCNT variable
is 0.6195, meaning that the average
concentration of commercial banks in
Indonesia for the past seven years is
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61.95%. Based on the variables used in the
test, the average standard deviation is in the
range of 0.0038 to 1.4338, except for the
AGE variable, which records the largest
standard deviation value of 16.5954. This
can be due to the varied age of the banks, of
which there are recently established banks
such as Bank BNI Syariah and Bank BCA
Syariah. There are also banks that have been
established for a long length of time, such
as the QNB Bank.
Table 5 shows the results of
Hypothesis 1 testing regarding the association of concentrated ownership and banking
performance in Indonesia. The test results
indicate the opposite results to previous
studies, namely that concentrated ownership is not significantly associated with
banking performance in the form of ROA
and ROE, indicated by the p-value, which is
above 0.1. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is rejected.
Test results on Model 1 and Model 2
are the opposite of the previous studies conducted in developing countries such as
Korea (Lee and Lee 2014), and China (Bian
and Deng 2017). Usually there is a
possibility of a more dominant expropriation effect in Indonesia as a developing
country. This is possible given that investor
protection and the regulation of corporate
governance in developing countries are still
very lacking compared to developed countries (La Porta et al.2002). However, it can
also be assumed that the regulation issued
by the regulator may have decreased the
negative effect of concentrated ownership,
thus resulting in no significant relationship
between concentrated ownership and bank
profitability in Indonesia.
Furthermore, Model 3 and Model 4
exhibit mixed results. Model 3 does not find
the mixed-effects between monitoring
effects and expropriation effects with
regard to the relationship between concentrated ownership and bank performance in
Indonesia, whereas Model 4 does. This result is portrayed by the insignificant result
of the CONPRCNT2, which represents a
non-linear relationship. This result for

Model 4 signifies that there is a mixedeffect between monitoring effects and expropriation effects on the relationship between concentrated ownership and bank
performance measured by ROE. Therefore,
these mixed-effects might also explain why
there is no significant relation between concentrated ownership and bank performance.
Since both effects exist, they might offset
one another, resulting in no significant relation.
These findings of the insignificant relationship of concentrated ownership and
profitability on Model 1 and Model 2 are
also driven by the concentrated average
ownership factor of 61.95%, which is still
far above the limit set in the POJK No.
56/POJK.03/2016 on Shared Ownership of
Commercial Banks with regard to the limitation of concentrated ownership in
Indonesia, specifically by 40%. This raises
the possibility of expropriation of larger minority shareholders in Indonesia. However,
the large concentrated ownership could also
increase the monitoring effect by the
majority shareholders. As such, they can
help oversee the decision-making process.
Therefore, as explained above, these two
effects completed one another and caused
no overall significant relation on concentrated ownership and bank performance.
In testing, the control variables of
SIZE, AGE, GROWTH, and GDP give a
significant positive after effect on each
ROA and ROE model. These are in contrast
to the NPL and PUBL variables, which
possess significant negative effects on the
ROA and ROE variables. The result on
PUBL variables insinuates that the public
banks’ profitability is not higher than the
non-public banks, thus supporting the previous statement that the performance of
non-public banks is more superior. This
may be caused by the better asset utilization
and managerial performance of non-public
banks (Koley 2019). The test on Model 6
and Model 7 (on the testing of Hypothesis
2) also confirmed the same result regarding
public and non-public banks.
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Table 6
Average Ownership of the Largest Shareholder in Banking Industry in Indonesia 2012 – 2018
Year

CONPRCNT Average
2012
65.26%
2013
62.89%
2014
60.69%
2015
60.82%
2016
60.93%
2017
61.01%
2018
62.23%
CONPRCNT = the percentage ownership of the largest shareholder
Source: from data processed

Table 7
Hypothesis 2 Test Results (regression)

CON
FIN
IND
CON*FIN
CON*IND
SIZE
AGE
NPL
GROWTH
GDP
PUBL
_cons
Prob > chi2
Adj R-sq

Model 5

Model 6

ROA

ROE

Coefficient
p-value
-0.0033
0.181
-0.0054
0.131
-0.0061
0.227
0.0016
0.677
0.0167
0.004***
0.0048
0.000***
0.0002
0.011**
-0.3773
0.000***
0.0108
0.000***
0.6980
0.000***
-0.0125
0.000***
-0.1559
0.000***
0.0000
0.4494

Coefficient
p-value
-0.0142
0.335
-0.0551
0.009***
-0.0785
0.008***
-0.0106
0.641
0.0462
0.155
0.0360
0.000***
0.0006
0.201
-2.0499
0.000***
0.0816
0.000***
7.4101
0.000***
-0.0714
0.000***
-1.2880
0.000***
0.0000
0.5049

P-value at: *** 𝛼 = 1%, ** 𝛼 = 5%, *𝛼 = 10%. ROA = profit before tax / average total assets; ROE = profit after
tax / average total equity; FIN = dummy variable (1 = largest share owned by financial institutions, 0 = others);
IND = dummy variable (1 = largest share owned by individuals, 0 = others); SIZE = company size; AGE =
company age; NPL = credit risk; GROWTH = company revenue growth; GDP = GDP growth; PUBL = dummy
variable (1 = public bank, 0 = others).
Source: from data processed.

Table 6 shows the average concentrated ownership in banks in Indonesia each
year for the period 2012 to 2018; it can be
seen that the number of CONPRCNT
ranges from 60% upward. This value is still
far above the limit set by OJK in the POJK
No. 56/POJK.03/2016 regarding Share
Ownership of Commercial Banks, so this
discovery can be a reference for regulators
to intensify the application of these limits.

In addition, the regulator can also simplify
the administrative stages for purchasing
shares or issuing shares for Initial Public
Offering (IPO) so that it can attract new investors to invest their capital. This can also
encourage the implementation of POJK No.
56/POJK.03/2016 regarding Share Ownership of Commercial Banks, which not only
seeks bank consolidation, but also dispersed
ownership in banking.
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Table 7 portrays the regression test results of Hypothesis 2 regarding the difference in profitability in concentrated ownership held by financial and non-financial institutions. In this test, individual ownership
is excluded from non-financial institutions.
The regression on Table 7 insinuates that
the concentrated ownership by financial institutions is only negatively and significantly associated with the bank profitability
measured by ROE. However, when testing
the relation on the concentrated ownership
and its type of ownership institution
(CON*FIN), it does not show a significant
result. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is rejected since
there is no difference in the association of
profitability and concentrated ownership on
financial and non-financial institutions.
Usually, the presence of financial institution ownership might help to ensure the
right decision-making by the management,
as well as having a role to oversee the
management (Musallam et al. 2018). Ownership by financial institutions could reduce
acts of exploitation. Elyasiani and Jia
(2010) who studied the exploitation view
state that it is possible for majority shareholders to exploit minority shareholders to
enable the company to have reduced performance. However, financial institutional
shareholders also do not always have a
positive effect in holding the role of
majority shareholders because it allows
them to only carry out passive monitoring;
this is also referred to as the passive monitoring view, as found by David and Kochtar
(1996).Under this view, institutional shareholders who have shares concentrated in
Indonesian banks may only play a role as
short-term traders who prioritize short-term
profits, thus their existence as shareholders
may not make any difference on bank performance.
CONCLUSION
The results of the study indicate that
concentrated ownership is not associated
with bank performance. Furthermore,

testing of the non-linear relationship indicates the absence of a non-linear relation between concentrated ownership and profitability. Hence, this non-significant relationship indicates that there may be a mixedeffect of expropriation and monitoring motives that offset one another, causing no relation between concentrated ownership and
bank performance in Indonesia. Thus, based
on the results of this study, POJK No.
56/POJK.03/2016 concerning Commercial
Bank Share Ownership, in which the OJK's
desire to limit the ownership of shares of
commercial banks, may not be effective in
increasing bank profitability (ROA, ROE).
The regression test to examine
whether there is any effect of financial institutions as the largest shareholder on the
relation between concentrated ownership
and profitability shows that the effect is not
significant. This is presumably because institutional shareholders tend to hold shortterm roles as traders who are only concerned with short-term profits, and not fully
uphold the overseeing role.
If it is associated with POJK No.
56/POJK.03/2016 concerning Commercial
Bank Share Ownership, the average share of
the largest ownership of commercial banks
is far above the limitation set by the regulator. Statistically, the average ownership
concentrated in Indonesian banking is
currently still at 61.95%, while the limitation of the regulator's maximum ownership
limit is at 40 percent.
There are some limitations to this
study. Initially, this study only divides concentrated ownership as financial and nonfinancial institutions, and was not fully in
accordance with the division determined by
POJK No. 56/POJK.03/2016 concerning
Commercial Bank Share Ownership. Under
this regulation, there is also a division of
ownership by non-financial institutions and
individuals. Referring to POJK No.
56/POJK.03/2016 concerning Commercial
Bank Share Ownership, this study only explored the ownership limits concentrated in
the category of financial and non-financial
institutions by 40%. Secondly, this research
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does not take the divergence between
ownership or cash flow right and control or
voting rights into account, although there is
existing literature regarding this topic.
Third, this study only used the direct or the
largest shareholder as a measurement for
concentrated ownership and did not
examine the role of the multiple large shareholders.
POJK No. 56/POJK.03/2016 concerning Commercial Bank Share Ownership also involves the soundness of banks in
implementing this regulation. However, this
study did not include the factor of bank
soundness. This study also did not divide
the sample of banks according to the Bank
Umum berdasarkan Kegiatan Usaha
(BUKU) bank categories and was only conducted in Indonesia and not compared with
banks in other countries.
There are a few recommendations for
further research; research related to concentrated ownership limits can also explore the
30% ownership limit category for ownership of non-financial legal entities and 20%
for individual ownership, as regulated by
POJK No. 56/POJK.03/2016 concerning
Commercial Bank Share Ownership. Additional analysis can also be conducted related
to the influence of the composition of ownership and existence of multiple large shareholders on banking performance for more in
depth research on the relationship of concentrated ownership to banking performance. Future study can also add other factors to the levels of bank health in the study
so that it is more in line with POJK No.
56/POJK.03/2016 concerning Commercial
Bank Share Ownership. Further research
can also use other measurements of banking
performance in addition to ROA and ROE
so that the effect of concentrated ownership
on other banking performance proxies can
be seen (one example is Tobin’s Q). This
may reduce the bias in the measurements
since the accounting-based measure can be
easily manipulated by the management
while the market data cannot (Groß 2007).
In addition to conducting a different test for
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Hypothesis 2, a regression test can be
carried out relating to the relationship between concentrated ownership of financial
institutions to banking performance. This
can enrich the existing research on concentrated ownership relationships on banking
performance in terms of management by financial institutions in banking. Future researchers can also divide the sample of
banks based on the bank categories of
BUKU 1,2,3, and 4 to gain better insight on
whether there is a relationship between concentrated ownership and bank profitability.
Furthermore, subsequent research can also
broaden the scope of research in banking
throughout ASEAN in order to see how
banks in Indonesia compare to banks in
other ASEAN countries. ASEAN banking
is considered important due to the endorsement of the ASEAN Banking Integration
Framework, which is expected to harmonize banking regulations.
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